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Introduction
Trust in companies is regarded as a fundamental
element of corporate success, because it builds and
supports long-term relationships between a company
and its stakeholder groups and, therefore, generates
supportive behavior while preventing unsupportive
behavior (Caldwell et al., 2008a; Grunig et al., 2002;
Hon and Grunig, 1999; Huang, 2001; Ki and Hon,
2007). As a social mechanism, it plays an important
role in the transaction cost approach, because it lets
the organizations react more flexibly to changing
market conditions by saving time in the transaction
process. They are able to contract less ex ante than
without trust (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996; Dyer
and Chu, 2003; Mo¨llering et al., 2004; Zaheer et al.,
1998). Trust can be seen as the opposite of oppor-
tunistic action. When trust is strong, less governance
structures such as safeguards in transactions are
needed to prevent opportunism, and, therefore, costs
for the organization decrease. Thus, trust leads to a
competitive advantage (Barney and Hansen, 1994;
Sako, 1998). As negotiation and dialogue between a
company and stakeholder groups are highly relevant,
especially in conflict management, trust leads to
stronger cooperative behavior (Christen, 2004).
Not only is the company as a collective player a
key factor, but also is trust in the companies’ Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs) because the CEOs rep-
resent the company and, therefore, have a strong
impact on the corporate image (Park and Berger,
2004; Skolnik, 1994) which in turn influences trust
building. Therefore, stakeholders’ trust-building can
be analyzed on two levels: On the one hand, there is
individual trust in a CEO and on the other, in the
company as collective trustee. Organizations are
expected to be more stable than individuals, because
‘‘institutional arrangements […] make significant 
dishonesty risky, even difficult’’ for companies, more
than for an individual (Hardin, 1991, p. 204).
Nevertheless, both individual and organization need
the reputation they have established.
The first aim of our study is to analyze which
elements influence trust building for both company
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and CEO, against the background of this interde-
pendency between trust in a company and in its
CEO. We consider the dimensions of ability, benev-
olence, and integrity that form trust in both a company
and a CEO (Caldwell and Clapham, 2003).
As individuals very seldom have direct, personal
contact with the company except through its
products and services, information from the media
about an international company or CEO is the basic
source of information for building trust. Therefore,
our second aim is to find out what kind of media is
used by the respondents for becoming informed
about trust-building behavior. We address these two
research questions by means of a standardized survey
in Switzerland.
Theoretical foundations and research
questions
In the present research, there is a confusing variety of
different definitions of trust, which is basically a
consequence of the construct’s complexity. Trust is
regarded as a central construct in various scientific
disciplines such as philosophy, economics, sociology,
and political and communication sciences, which
have different approaches as a matter of course
(Hosmer, 1995). One reason for the growing interest
in trust is based on the awareness that social changes
and a growing differentiation of roles result in a
need for trust as a basis and an alternative to the
eroded traditional social structure. Therefore, trust is
regarded as a key concept for a functioning modern
society (Hardin, 2006; Kohring and Matthes, 2007;
Mo¨llering et al., 2004).
Furthermore, trust refers to different levels of
trusted individuals or parties (Zaheer et al., 1998).
Trust can be built for others in general (dispositional
trust) or for a real exchange partner (relational trust),
which can be individual or collective. First, we focus
on the general nature of trust and explain the rela-
tionship between entrusted (trustor) and trustee. The
trustor is defined as the origin of trust while the
trustee is its referent (Mayer et al., 1995). Second, we
analyze the different dimensions that build trust.
Third, we distinguish between the personal and
organizational levels of trust and specify the
definitions of trust that undergird the study and frame
the research questions and hypotheses for the
subsequent study.
The nature of trust
Coping with risky situations is an important
dimension in the definition of trust throughout the
different approaches and disciplines: Only when risk
and uncertainty exist, is there a need to trust (Hardin,
2006; Mayer et al., 1995). Therefore, vul-nerability is
central to this understanding. In our study, we define
trust as an attitude of a trustor toward a trustee in a
risky situation for the trustor. Trust is built on
evaluations of the trustee’s ability, integrity,
benevolence, and information quality by the trustor.
Trust is a construct that enables people to cope
with risks and, therefore, to interact with other
people, despite an existing informational imbalance
(McAllister, 1995). The trusted party has more
information regarding the topic and thus the trustor
has to expect that the trustee will act according to
the benefits of the trusting person.
Mayer et al. define trust as ‘‘the willingness of a
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other will perform
a particular action important to the trustor, irre-
spective of the ability to monitor or control that
other party’’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). This def-
inition can be extended with the understanding of
trust as ‘‘an expression of faith and confidence that a
person will be fair, reliable, ethical, competent, and
nonthreatening’’ (Carnevale, 1995, p. xi). Caldwell
and Clapham define trust according to the definition
by Mayer et al. mentioned above: Trust is ‘‘the
subjectively perceived point on a continuum at
which a group or organization’s behavior is per-
ceived as complying with the ethical duties consid-
ered to be owed to the person or organization who
is making the decision to trust’’ (1995, p. 356).
Hardin describes the motivation of trust-building
by defining trust as ‘‘encapsulated interests.’’ First of
all, the trustee wants to maintain the ongoing rela-
tionship with the trustor ‘‘because it is not merely
the present fulfillment that matters but also all that
might come from [their] long-run future interac-
tions’’ (Hardin, 2006, p. 19). Even if no direct
relationship exists, the trustee might encapsulate the
interests of the trustor because he wants to maintain
his reputation and trustworthiness. His motivation
can be moralistic or selfish, direct, or indirect. What
matters is that the trustee acts in favor of the trustor’s
expectations. Trust is a temporal phenomenon,
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because it builds upon the experiences, perceptions,
and interactions of the trustee (Caldwell and Clap-
ham, 2003). It is a basis for future action (Luhmann,
1979; McAllister, 1995; Shapiro, 1990).
Although trustworthiness is often understood as a
synonym for trust (Christen, 2004), a differentiation
between trust and perceived trustworthiness is nee-
ded, because the decision to trust is based on the
trustworthiness of the other person, i.e., the trustee
(Caldwell and Clapham, 2003, 2008a, b). Trust-
worthiness is ‘‘a subjectively defined attribution
about another person or party that is determined by
each person at the individual or organizational
level’’ (Caldwell et al., 2008b, p. 158). Therefore,
perceived trustworthiness is based on the subjective
evaluation of different characteristics and behavior of
the trustee. Trust can, therefore, be defined as a
multidimen-sional construct comprising different
dimensions of the trustee’s attributes that the trustor
evaluates.
Trust as a multidimensional construct: dimensions
of trust building
Trust is based on trustworthiness and, therefore, on
the perception of competence, responsibility and
dependability of the trustee. Thus, it is modeled as a
multidimensional construct, based on cognitive and
affective elements (Butler, 1991; McAllister, 1995).
On the one hand, people decide for good reasons –
they decide in a cognitive way whether to regard the
other as trustworthy or not. On the other hand,
emotional bonds between the trustor and the trustee
have an affective impact on trust building (La¨msa¨ and
Pucetaite, 2006; McAllister, 1995). These bonds are
assumed to be reciprocal and individuals have to
know each other personally – they have to interact
frequently to develop these emotional bonds. When
the trustor has no direct experience with the trustee,
reputation is an important dimension, because the
trustor assumes that the trustee will act in a trust-
worthy way to avoid losing his good reputation
(Hardin, 2006).
Concerning ‘‘good reasons,’’ the cognitive rea-
sons for trusting, the dimensions ability, integrity, and
benevolence are of importance in this research (Cald-
well et al., 2003; Mayer et al., 1995). Antecedents of
these three dimensions are developed by Butler and
Cantrell (1984), who differentiate between integrity,
consistency, loyalty, openness, and competence and,
therefore, account for morality with the first four
dimensions as well as for ability with the competence
dimension (Butler, 1991; Hosmer, 1995). Sako
(1998) distinguishes among three types of trust that
also include the facets mentioned above: contractual
trust referring to the fulfillment of contractual
agreements, competence trust referring to the ability to
actually do the things promised and goodwill trust
referring to the ability to make an open-ended
commitment to take initiatives for mutual benefit
while refraining from unfair advantage taking.
According to Mayer et al., ability is understood as
competence within a certain field and thus as
expertise. Caldwell and Clapham split the three
dimensions ability, integrity, and benevolence into seven
facets. Competence, quality assurance, and financial
balance can be related to ability (1995, p. 352).
Integrity is defined as the perception of the trustee as
having a strong sense of justice and acting according
to it. It is measured by the perception of the trustor
(1) to what extent a congruency exists between the
activities and the promises a party gives and (2)
whether the trustee develops a procedural fairness
and transparency toward the trustor. Finally, benevo-
lence describes the trustees’ attempts to do good to the
trustors without thinking of their own benefit. For
measuring benevolence, Caldwell and Clapham define
(1) interactional courtesy and thus the degree of re-
spect for others by acting; and (2) the responsibilities
of the trustee to inform the trustor about the activities
(Caldwell and Clapham, 2003; Mayer et al., 1995).
Another dimension that influences trust in a
company or a CEO is information quality. When
the trustee’s given information is comprehensible,
the trustor is more willing to build trust (Bentele,
1994; Nawratil, 1999; Ru¨hl, 2005; Wirth, 1999),
and the perceived transparency of the company and/
or the CEO is strengthened. Bentele traces it back to
basic individual social trust, which is generated
within the socialization process. Therefore, corre-
lates of behavior make it possible to judge between
honest and dishonest behavior and are, therefore, the
bases for trust building in general (Bentele, 1994).
The elements of ability, integrity, benevolence, and
information quality concern the trustees, because they
represent their perceived trustworthiness. For build-
ing trust in the trustee, the trustor has to evaluate
different dimensions of trustworthiness that form
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trust and, therefore, perceived characteristics and
former actions of the trustee lead to trust-building
(Mayer et al., 1995).
Trust in an individual and in an organization
Trust on the organizational level between an indi-
vidual trustor and an organization or an organiza-
tional representative as trustee is closely related to
interpersonal trust between two individuals who
know each other personally. The origin of trust lies
in the individual, whereas the referent, the trusted
party, can be both individual and collective (Zaheer
et al., 1998).
Trust on the organizational level means that trust
is generated by the behavior of the company that
should be trusted (Caldwell and Clapham, 2003;
Mayer et al., 1995). This understanding of trust fits
into the trusting relationship between individual
stakeholders and a company as a collective actor.
Where trust in a CEO is concerned, there is an even
stronger correspondence to interpersonal trust, be-
cause two individuals, the stakeholder and the CEO,
are involved. However, the CEO does not know the
individual stakeholder in person, and, therefore, the
relationship is not reciprocal on an individual level.
Trust in a company as a collective actor and in the
CEO as a representative can be completely different:
A company can be trusted to another degree than
the individuals that work for the company (Currall
and Inkpen, 2002). Thus, trust in the CEO and the
company are important for decision-making pro-
cesses of individuals (Mo¨llering and Sydow, 2005).
In order to analyze whether differences exist
between the evaluation of companies and CEOs, we
compare the findings of these two levels. Therefore,
we develop only one instrument to measure trust in
a company and in a CEO.
In order to analyze how trust is built for inter-
nationally active companies and CEOs, we focus on
the following first research question and two
hypotheses:
RQ1: Which elements influence trust in a company
as a collective trustee and in the CEO as a
single trustee?
H1: There is a difference between the degree of
trust in the companies and in the CEO.
H2: There is a difference between the dimensions
that influence trust between the companies and
the CEOs.
Trust and media use
The missing reciprocal relationship between trustor
and trustee on the organizational level implies that
individuals get most information about the trustee
from media coverage. Thus, when evaluating CEOs
and companies, individuals will primarily think of
information they got through media coverage.
Considering the size of the organizations that act on
an international level, it is unlikely for respondents
to have personal experience with the company’s
CEO beside products and services (Bentele, 1994;
Bentele and Seidenglanz, 2005; Nawratil, 1999).
When people use traditional media like television
news, newspapers, and radio to get information
about a company or CEO, they obtain general and
less detailed information about various economic
topics. In contrast, users of the Internet, company
homepages, and special-interest journals can perform
much more detailed searches and, therefore, are
more likely to get special information about a
company and/or CEO. Hence, variety of choices in
news coverage is especially important as perceived
‘‘gratification-opportunity’’ regarding motivation
for using Internet sources for news (Dimmick et al.,
2004). In studies about the Internet and political
information, the Internet is regarded as a medium
that serves information seeking needs and that pro-
vides special information which is easy to obtain.
Whether using the Internet to locate special infor-
mation has a positive impact on trust in the gov-
ernment remains an open question regarding
political communication. Initial studies could not
identify a significant relationship (Kaye and Johnson,
2002). As users of special media sources like the
Internet, company homepages, and special-interest
journals are able to vary their news sources and
decide about the combination of information, we
expect that respondents who use special media
sources feel more adequately informed. They,
therefore, tend to have a different level of trust in the
companies than the people who get more general
information from traditional media. As special
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information can lead either to more or less trust, we
do not define whether trust is higher or lower for
people who use traditional media.
As people who rely on special information sources
and the traditional media are best informed about the
activities of the company and/or CEO in question,
they will feel more adequately informed and have a
higher level of trust than people who do not use any
media for getting information about the company at
all.
The second research question addresses the role of
media use for trust building on an organizational
level. We ask, therefore, which media the respon-
dents use for getting information about the com-
pany/CEO in question and whether the use of
different types of media reveals a correlation with the
degree of trust.
RQ2: Does the use of different media sources for
getting information about internationally
active CEOs/companies correlate with the
evaluation of the CEOs/companies?
H3: Respondents who use traditional media sour-
ces evaluate trust dimensions in a different way
than respondents who use special media sour-
ces for getting information about the com-
pany/CEO.
H4: Respondents, who use both traditional and
special media sources evaluate trust dimensions
more positively than respondents who infre-
quently use media coverage for getting infor-
mation about the company/CEO (Figure 1).
Research design
In order to answer the research questions, we con-
ducted a standardized, written survey. The object of
investigation is not one multinational acting com-
pany or one CEO, but different ones:1 People 
responded to questions regarding the company or
the CEO of their own choice. Respondents had to
name a company or CEO in the beginning and
answer the questions in light of their choices. By
mentioning a company/CEO for which/whom the
respondents answer the survey questions, we made
sure that people knew the company or the CEO
about which/whom they had to answer the ques-
tionnaire. In order to compare the results of the two
objects of investigation, we developed a similar
questionnaire for companies and CEOs.
In the survey, we included questions regarding
the four dimensions of influence on trust. For an
overview over the items for ability, integrity,
benevolence, quality of information, and trust
(global variable), see Appendix Table VIII.
Ability was defined as expertise, competence, and
an assurance of quality (Caldwell and Clapham,
2003; Mayer et al., 1995). Thus, we measure ability
according to the following items: whether the
company/CEO is economically successful, whether
it/she/he stands for product quality, and whether it/
she/he works with comprehensive attention to de-
tail. Integrity means that the trustee shares principles
with the trustor and acts upon them (Mayer et al.,
1995). According to Caldwell and Clapham, this
means legal compliance and procedural fairness
(Caldwell and Clapham, 2003). In order to opera-
tionalize integrity, we asked whether the activities of
a company/CEO are perceived as being in accor-
dance with its promises and whether it/she/he
demonstrates law-abiding behavior. To explain
the construct of benevolence, Mayer et al. give the
following example: ‘‘The mentor wants to help the
protege, even though the mentor is not required to
be helpful, and there is no extrinsic reward for the
mentor’’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719) This is exactly
what happens when a company or CEO acts in a
socially responsible way. Caldwell and Clapham also
mention the responsibility to inform as a benevolent
characteristic. Therefore, we measured benevolence
with items regarding the perception of social
responsibility of the company and the CEO, and
extensive public information about corporate activ-
ities.
Quality of information is also important for building
trust, because it strengthens transparency and reli-
ability (Wirth, 1999). We asked the respondents to
Ability
Benevolence
Integrity
Information        
quality
Trust
Media Use:
Different media 
types
RQ1 RQ2
Figure 1. Trust in companies and in CEOs: research
questions.
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evaluate the quality of information regarding its
objectivity and factual basis and its factor of intelli-
gibility.
Every item was formulated as a statement that the
respondent had to evaluate on a scale from
1 = ‘‘strongly agree’’ to 5 = ‘‘do not agree at all.’’
In order to test the influence of these dimensions
on trust and sympathy for the CEO/the company,
we included a manifest variable that directly mea-
sures the perceived trust the trustor has for the
mentioned company/CEO. The respondents had to
answer how intense they regard their trust in and
sympathy for the specific company/CEO (scale from
1 = ‘‘very’’ to 5 = ‘‘not at all’’).
For analyzing how the media use relates to trust
building in companies or CEOs, the respondents had
to answer how often they use different media types
to get information regarding the company/CEO in
question on a scale from 1 = ‘‘everyday’’ to
5 = ‘‘never.’’
Finally, the respondents’ socio-demographic
characteristics such as sex, age, and education level
were surveyed.
Sample
Overall, we surveyed people in three German-
speaking cities in Switzerland in 2007 (n = 245). 120
respondents answered questions regarding a CEO,
and 125 were asked about a company chosen by
themselves.
In order to get random samples, every third
person, who passed the interviewers in three
main locations in three cities in Switzerland, was
approached to answer the questionnaire.
In both samples, there is nearly a gender balance
(CEOs: 61% male and 39% female respondents,
companies: 48% male, 52% female). The age of the
respondents averaged 40 years, whereas 50% were
under the age of 35.
As shown in Table I, most of the respondents are
employees without any executive position in the
company (sample CEO: 48%, companies: 40%),
around 22% are students (sample CEO: 20%, com-
panies: 25%), and around 13% of the respondents are
employees in management positions (sample CEO:
14%, companies: 13%). We also ask the respondents
for the type of company they work for to control for
differences in knowledge about the structures and
processes of international companies. About 39% of
the employees do not work in a for-profit company
at all (sample CEO: 32%, companies: 45%) and
about 10% work for a company that acts interna-
tionally (sample CEO: 11%, companies: 8%).
Results
Difference in the degrees of trust in companies
and in CEOs
Hypothesis 1 states a difference in the degrees of
trust in companies and in CEOs. We tested the
differences of the arithmetic means between CEOs
and companies by means of a t-test for independent
samples (Tables II, III).
Results show that trust in CEOs is significantly
lower than trust in companies (arithmetic mean of
3.04 and 2.61 on a five-point-scale with 1 = ‘‘agree
totally’’ and 5 = ‘‘do not agree at all’’), which cor-
responds to the rating of sympathy (AM = 3.07 and
2.68). That means that companies as collective
trustees are able to generate more trust and sympathy
than CEO as the individual trustee.
A comparison between companies and CEOs
regarding the ranking of the different items supports
TABLE I
Percentage of professions mentioned by respondents
Sample
CEO
(n = 118) (%)
Company
(n = 124) (%)
Employee in management
position
14 13
Employee without
management position
48 40
Self-employed 8 7
Trainee 3 3
Student 20 25
Pupil 2 1
Housewife 1 2
Unemployed 2 5
Other 2 4
Total 100 100
6
these findings. Companies are consistently better
evaluated in all the categories. In particular, the
items of economic success, comprehensive atten-
tion to detail (detail-orientation), activity in accor-
dance with promises, extensive public information,
and comprehensible information (intelligibility) are
ranked significantly higher for companies than for
CEOs.
Thus, hypothesis 1 is confirmed: there is a dif-
ference between the degrees of trust in a company
and in a CEO, because trust in a company is eval-
uated systematically higher than trust in CEOs.
Variables Arithmetic mean SD
CEO
(n = 120)
Company
(n = 125)
CEO
(n = 120)
Company
(n = 125)
Ability Economic success 1.57 1.37 0.776 0.561
Product quality 1.90 1.80 0.909 0.893
Detail-orientation 2.22 2.24 0.949 0.926
Integrity Activity in accordance with promises 2.54 2.28 0.897 0.984
Law-abiding behavior 2.59 2.42 1.064 1.094
Benevolence Social responsibility 3.24 3.06 1.127 1.132
Extensive public information 3.23 2.88 0.983 0.947
Information quality Objectivity 2.17 2.14 0.792 0.886
Intelligibility 2.53 2.27 0.898 0.912
Trust Global variable 3.04 2.61 1.08 0.985
Sympathy Global variable 3.07 2.68 1.128 1.137
Media use News on TV 2.96 3.17 1.108 1.085
News on Internet 3.33 3.47 1.346 1.295
News on homepage 4.25 4.01 1.075 1.24
News on radio 3.49 3.69 1.073 1.136
News in newspapers 3.12 3.29 1.202 1.202
News special-interest magazines 3.82 3.85 1.24 1.073
TABLE III
T-values for arithmetic differences between the group companies and CEOs
Variables T-values for
difference
Ability Economic success 2.335**
Product quality 0.805
Detail-orientation 4.057**
Integrity Activity in accordance with promises 2.150*
Law-abiding behavior 1.225
Benevolence Social responsibility 1.236
Extensive public information 2.798**
Information quality Objectivity 0.219
Intelligibility 2.306*
Trust Global variable 3.241**
*Significant with p £ 0.05; **Significant with p £ 0.01.
TABLE II
Arithmetic means and standard deviations of variables for the samples in respect of CEOs and companies
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Impact of different dimensions on trust
Hypothesis 2 focuses on how the dimensions ability,
integrity, benevolence, and information quality influence
trust in companies and in CEOs. We analyzed the
effects by calculating two regression analyses for the
two samples. As the standard errors can be biased in
small samples when outliers in the residuals exist, we
controlled the analyses for outliers (Urban and
Mayerl, 2006). Hence, we excluded six cases for the
CEO sample and three cases for the company sample
to obtain reliable significances. In order to rule out
multicollinearity, we calculated tolerances for the
explanatory variables. Tolerance measures how
much of the variance of one explanatory variable is
explained by the other independent variables. The
lowest tolerance scores are 0.46 (in the company
sample for law-abiding behavior) and 0.49 (in the
CEO sample for extensive public information). This
means, that these items have more than 50% free
variance which can explain the dependent variable.
Therefore, it could be shown that each item has for
itself a high explanatory potential for trust, although
the correlations between the items are mostly sig-
nificant (see Appendix Table IX).
The first regression analysis shows that trust in
CEOs is influenced especially by items that belong to
the benevolence and to the integrity component of trust:
being socially responsible and by acting in accordance
with promises. Ability also explains trust in CEOs by
the item of working with comprehensive attention to
detail. Nevertheless, information quality has no signifi-
cant influence on trust in CEOs. In the second
regression analysis, trust in companies is strongly
explained by the item respect for laws and, therefore,
by integrity. Benevolence is also a strongly influencing
dimension in our regression analysis because both
items, extensive public information and social
responsibility of the companies, are significantly
influential. Finally, quality of the products, and thus
ability, also explains trust in internationally acting
companies, whereas information quality has no signifi-
cant impact in this sample (Table IV).
Results indicate that for CEOs as well as for
companies, ability, benevolence, and integrity are sig-
nificantly important for trust building, whereas the
influence shifts slightly from a balance between the
three dimensions on trust in CEOs to a dominance
of benevolence on trust in companies. Information
quality shows no significance at all. As hypothesis 2
assumes that the four dimensions are important for
building trust although the importance of the facets
differs between companies and CEOs, it can be
confirmed only partially.
Differences in evaluating trust dimensions between users
of different media types
The second research question deals with the rela-
tionship between the use of media types and trust.
Here, we merged the data sets of CEO and company
in the analysis.
First, we calculated an explanatory factor analysis
(main components, Varimax-rotated). With this anal-
ysis, we tested whether media use can be separated into
the use of traditional and/or special media sources.
Factor analysis shows that the variables can clearly
be classified as use of traditional and/or special media
sources. On the first factor extracted, news on TV, in
newspapers, and radio news loaded with at least 0.73
(newspapers); the second factor has high loadings of
the use of special-interest journals, news on the
Internet, and news on the homepage with at least 0.62
(special-interest journals). Both factors are able to
explain 61% of the variance. Therefore, the separation
of media use into traditional versus special media
sources is supported by this finding (Table V).
Hence, in the second step we divided the respon-
dents into user-groups. First of all, we differentiated
between frequent and infrequent media use. In our
questions regarding media use we distinguished
between ‘‘every day,’’ ‘‘at least once a week,’’ ‘‘at least
once a month,’’ ‘‘less than once a month’’ and
‘‘never.’’ We drew the line between users, who use a
medium at least once a week and less than that. We
defined the first group as that which uses all proposed
media options only infrequently and, therefore, less
than once a week to get information about the com-
pany/CEO (n = 102). The second group uses tradi-
tional media frequently (n = 50), the third group uses
special media sources frequently (n = 27), and, finally,
the fourth group uses both traditional and special
media sources frequently (n = 54).
In order to test hypothesis 3, we compared means
between the groups of special and traditional media
users of the variables that build trust and the trust
variable itself.
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Against our assumption, the global variable trust
and the items for information quality do not differ
between the groups. Just the items – adequate public
information and social responsibility and, therefore,
the evaluation of the benevolence of the company/
CEO – reveal differences. These items are signifi-
cantly more positively evaluated by users of special
media sources coverage than by users of traditional
media. This means that people, who use Internet
news, homepages, and special-interest journals for
getting information about a company/CEO, do
honor benevolent activities more than the users of
television news, newspapers, and radio.
Thus, hypothesis 3 can only partially be con-
firmed for the evaluation of the company’s/CEO’s
benevolent behavior, because the items of integrity,
information quality, and, in parts, ability show a ten-
dency we assumed, but these differences are not
significant.
Differences in evaluating trust dimensions between users
and non-users
Regarding hypothesis 4, we did not find any dif-
ferences concerning evaluation of ability, benevolence,
integrity, and information quality as dimensions of trust
between people who use both traditional and special
media sources and people who do not use media
coverage at all for getting information about the
company/CEO (see Tables VI and VII).
Therefore, hypotheses 4 must be rejected. But we
did find differences between people who use media
infrequently and respondents with frequent usage of
traditional media. People who used traditional
media, systematically evaluated trust overall and the
dimensions in a more negative way than people who
do not use any media coverage frequently for getting
information about companies/CEOs. As shown in
Table VI, the group with infrequent media use
evaluates trust overall with an average of 2.76,
whereas traditional media users have an average of
3.18. The same tendency is observable in the sub-
dimensions of trust: Regarding ability, evaluation of
2.17 for elaborateness and 1.75 for product quality is
significantly more positive for the non-users than for
the users of traditional media (2.50 and 2.10). Also,
the dimension benevolence with the items adequate
public information (3.01 vs. 3.46) and social respon-
sibility (3.04 vs. 3.62) differ in the same direction
between the two groups. For integrity, the item
activity is in accordance with promises (2.35 vs.
2.67), and for information quality, the item intelli-
gible information/intelligibility (2.30 vs. 2.60) shows
a significant difference.
Discussion and limitations
Trust is significantly important for a company’s
ongoing success. This is not only true for the
company as an organization, but also for the CEO’s
ability to establish trust in stakeholders. This
strengthens the long-term relationship between
stakeholders and the company. In order to analyze
what influences trust building in companies, it is
important not only to analyze the organization, but
also the individual, the CEO as trustee. Our study
Variables Factor 1: use of
traditional media
Factor 2: use
of specific media
Media use News on TV 0.731
News on radio 0.752
News in newspapers 0.768
News on Internet 0.770
News on homepage 0.858
NEWS special-interest magazines 0.617
R2 60.8
Principal components, Varimax-rotated, n = 245, loadings >0.04 included.
TABLE V
Explorative factor analysis for media use for information about company/CEO
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contributes to clearing the differences between trust
in companies and trust in CEOs. Therefore, we asked
whether a difference exists between the degrees of
trust in companies and in CEOs (hypothesis 1).
Results show that CEOs were significantly evaluated
more negatively regarding trust than companies as
collective trustees. These findings indicate that
respondents rate individuals much more critically
than collectives regarding ability, benevolence, and
integrity. One reason could be that a CEO is criti-
cized in public, especially by the media, for losses
and thus for decision-making mistakes in leading a
company. Therefore, they are frequently replaced,
whereas a company lasts and is merely regarded as an
organization which depends on the decisions of a
responsible CEO. Thus, trust in companies is built as
an accumulation of decisions taken by the companies
for a long period of time and, therefore, by different
and changing CEOs.
Regarding the differences in the impact of ability,
integrity, benevolence, and information quality on trust in
CEOs and companies (hypothesis 2), it could be
shown that the first three dimensions are important
for overall trust on both individual (CEO) and col-
lective (company) levels. Nevertheless, different
aspects are important for building trust for CEOs and
companies. For example, ability has an impact on
overall trust in CEOs, because detail-orientation of
the CEO is regarded as important. For companies, in
contrast, detail-orientation does not have a signifi-
cant influence but quality of products is crucial. This
is not surprising as products are usually linked with
companies as a whole and not with a CEO.
Regarding integrity, it is important for the respon-
dents that the CEO acts in accordance with his
promises, whereas the company should abide by the
law. Benevolence is especially important for trust in
companies, because both items have a significantly
positive impact. Social responsibility is influential
both for CEOs and companies. But, for being pos-
itively influential on the company’s success, stake-
holders have to notice social activities of both the
company and CEO. Thus, effective communication
strategies are needed.
Regarding RQ1 it can be stated that trust in
CEOs and in companies differs in the degree of
overall trust, because CEOs are evaluated more
critically than companies. Ability, benevolence, and
integrity play an important role in explaining the
degree of trust, whereas the influential items differ
between groups. Information quality does not have an
impact on trust in general.
Regarding RQ2, differences between user groups
of special versus traditional media were found for
benevolence (hypothesis 3). Companies report their
activities on Websites, and special-interest magazines
have more space to cover stories about benevolent
behavior, whereas newspapers and news on TV and
Variables T-values for diff.
traditional versus specific
T-values for diff.
both media versus
no media
T-values for diff.
traditional
versus no media
Ability Economic success -0.946 -0.871 -1.183
Product quality 1.464 -0.594 -2.310*
Detail-orientation 0.511 0.343 -2.248*
Integrity Activity in accordance with promises 1.494 0.244 -2.005*
Law-abiding behavior 0.599 -0.494 -1.200
Benevolence Social responsibility 2.855** -0.092 -3.109*
Extensive public information 3.220** 0.753 -2.852*
Information
quality
Objectivity 1.312 0.187 -1.232
Intelligibility 0.929 -0.722 -1.795
Trust Global variable 1.630 0.789 -2.408*
*Significant with p £ 0.05; **Significant with p £ 0.01.
TABLE VII
T-values for arithmetic differences between the different user groups of media
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radio focus particularly on topics like economic
success and product quality. Therefore, users of
special media sources are expected to get more
information about benevolent activities.
Surprisingly, there is no difference in the degree
of trust between people who do not use media at all
and the group of respondents that uses both tradi-
tional and special media sources and is, therefore,
highly informed (hypothesis 4). In order to explain
this finding, differences between users of traditional
media and non-users regarding trust and trust
dimensions were analyzed, and significant differ-
ences were found. Users of traditional media eval-
uated items of the three dimensions and overall trust
significantly more critically than non-users. Hence,
people who are infrequently informed by media
coverage do not evaluate people as negatively as
those who get general information from traditional
media. Non-users do not differ significantly from the
group that is highly informed (special and traditional
media use). These findings indicate that people who
are informed in a general and, therefore, more
superficial way are much more critical than people
who infrequently get their information from the
media and, therefore, use other channels for evalu-
ating companies and CEOs, or people who use
media information to a great extent and thus have
extensive and multifaceted information. For com-
panies and CEOs, it is, therefore, especially impor-
tant to get positive coverage in general media
regarding the dimensions that are important for
building trust. Regarding our findings, the images of
a CEO, who is detail-oriented, and a company
which stands for high product quality should be
established and strengthened especially in the general
media.
Finally, in our study, CEOs and the companies
were mentioned in a free way by respondents.
Altogether, respondents predominantly named
CEOs and companies they regarded as economically
successful and as specialists in their industrial sector
(93 and 88%, respectively at least, agreed to the
items). The arithmetic mean of economic success
was, therefore, higher than the other trust items
(1.57 for CEOs and 1.37 for companies). Thus, the
internationally active companies/CEOs mentioned
are perceived as economically successful, but less
benevolent.2 Therefore, we do not have a high
degree of variance regarding the ability dimension.
For further analysis, companies and CEOs should
vary regarding their perceived economic success.
Differences between industries should be controlled
as well.
Swiss companies are mentioned most often, when
asked about international companies. It can be
assumed that Swiss respondents are constantly
informed by the national media about internationally
active Swiss companies and recall them primarily
because frequent media coverage increases the
accessibility of information.
In future studies, it would be interesting to ana-
lyze whether our findings are also significant for
international companies in other host countries or
whether cultural effects can be found regarding
trust-building dimensions. Also, research on the
relationship of media coverage about companies and
CEOs with trust building could be an interesting and
an important focus for further analysis.
Notes
1 The company Nestle´ Swiss was mentioned most
often (34 times), followed by UBS (18 mentionings),
and Novartis (13). As CEOs, Marcel Ospel of UBS
(30), Daniel Vasella of Novartis (15), and Bill Gates
(Microsoft, 14) were recalled most frequently. There-
fore, only companies and CEOs were mentioned by the
respondents that are perceived as economically success-
ful (at least at the time of the survey).
2 In addition to economically successful companies,
the two other ability items – comprehensive attention
to detail and product quality – are on average evaluated
positively, with an arithmetic mean of 2.22 (elaborate-
ness, CEO) and 1.90 (product quality, CEO) and 2.24
and 1.80 resp. (company). In contrast, adequate public
information and social responsibility activities were eval-
uated lower than the other items for both companies
and CEOs (a.m. for social responsibility = 3.24 for
CEOs and = 3.06 for companies, adequate informa-
tion = 3.23 and = 2.88). This means, that benevolent
activities, in particular, are evaluated as only moderate
for both company and CEO.
Appendix
See Tables VIII and IX.
13
T
A
B
L
E
V
II
I
O
v
er
v
ie
w
o
f
th
e
it
em
s
fo
r
tr
u
st
an
d
m
ed
ia
u
se
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
S
ca
le
A
b
il
it
y
E
co
n
o
m
ic
su
cc
es
s
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
o
p
er
at
es
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
al
ly
su
cc
es
sf
u
l
an
d
ef
fi
ci
en
tl
y
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
P
ro
d
u
ct
q
u
al
it
y
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
st
an
d
s
fo
r
h
ig
h
p
ro
d
u
ct
q
u
al
it
y
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
D
et
ai
l-
o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
w
o
rk
s
w
it
h
co
m
p
re
-
h
en
si
v
e
at
te
n
ti
o
n
to
d
et
ai
l
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
In
te
g
ri
ty
A
ct
iv
it
y
in
ac
co
rd
an
ce
w
it
h
p
ro
m
is
es
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
ac
ts
in
ac
co
rd
an
ce
w
it
h
h
is
/h
er
/i
ts
p
ro
m
is
es
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
L
aw
-a
b
id
in
g
b
eh
av
io
r
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
ta
k
es
la
w
st
an
d
ar
d
s
se
ri
o
u
sl
y
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
B
en
ev
o
le
n
ce
S
o
ci
al
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
ac
ce
p
ts
so
ci
al
re
sp
o
n
si
-
b
il
it
y
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
E
x
te
n
si
v
e
p
u
b
li
c
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
T
h
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
in
fo
rm
s
th
e
p
u
b
li
c
ex
te
n
si
v
el
y
an
d
d
o
es
n
o
t
co
n
ce
al
im
p
o
rt
an
t
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
q
u
al
it
y
O
b
je
ct
iv
it
y
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
g
iv
en
b
y
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
is
fa
ct
u
al
b
as
ed
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
In
te
ll
ig
ib
il
it
y
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
g
iv
en
b
y
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
is
in
te
ll
ig
ib
le
1
=
‘‘
st
ro
n
g
ly
ag
re
e’
’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
ag
re
e
at
al
l’
’
T
ru
st
G
lo
b
al
v
ar
ia
b
le
H
o
w
m
u
ch
d
o
y
o
u
tr
u
st
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
?
1
=
‘‘
v
er
y
m
u
ch
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
at
al
l’
’
S
y
m
p
at
h
y
G
lo
b
al
v
ar
ia
b
le
H
o
w
m
u
ch
d
o
y
o
u
li
k
e
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
?
1
=
‘‘
v
er
y
m
u
ch
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
o
t
at
al
l’
’
M
ed
ia
u
se
N
ew
s
o
n
T
V
H
o
w
o
ft
en
d
o
y
o
u
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
fr
o
m
…
?
1
=
‘‘
ev
er
y
d
ay
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
ev
er
’’
N
ew
s
o
n
In
te
rn
et
H
o
w
o
ft
en
d
o
y
o
u
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
fr
o
m
…
?
1
=
‘‘
ev
er
y
d
ay
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
ev
er
’’
N
ew
s
o
n
h
o
m
ep
ag
e
H
o
w
o
ft
en
d
o
y
o
u
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
fr
o
m
…
?
1
=
‘‘
ev
er
y
d
ay
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
ev
er
’’
N
ew
s
o
n
ra
d
io
H
o
w
o
ft
en
d
o
y
o
u
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
fr
o
m
…
?
1
=
‘‘
ev
er
y
d
ay
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
ev
er
’’
N
ew
s
in
n
ew
sp
ap
er
s
H
o
w
o
ft
en
d
o
y
o
u
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
fr
o
m
…
?
1
=
‘‘
ev
er
y
d
ay
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
ev
er
’’
N
ew
s
sp
ec
ia
l-
in
te
re
st
m
ag
az
in
es
H
o
w
o
ft
en
d
o
y
o
u
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
o
u
t
th
e
C
E
O
/c
o
m
p
an
y
fr
o
m
…
?
1
=
‘‘
ev
er
y
d
ay
’’
to
5
=
‘‘
n
ev
er
’’
14
T
A
B
L
E
IX
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s
b
et
w
ee
n
it
em
s
fo
r
tr
u
st
d
im
en
si
o
n
s
(e
x
p
la
n
at
o
ry
v
ar
ia
b
le
s)
C
o
m
p
et
en
ce
In
te
g
ri
ty
B
en
ev
o
le
n
ce
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
q
u
al
it
y
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
A
b
il
it
y
E
co
n
o
m
ic
su
cc
es
s
(1
)
C
E
O
1
.0
0
0
.3
4
5
*
*
0
.5
0
7
*
*
0
.2
8
9
*
*
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
4
4
0
.1
4
6
0
.2
4
9
*
*
0
.1
0
9
E
co
n
o
m
ic
su
cc
es
s
(1
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
1
.0
0
-
0
.0
2
3
0
.3
3
1
*
*
0
.0
7
4
0
.0
1
9
-
0
.0
6
3
-
0
.0
6
8
-
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
3
8
P
ro
d
u
ct
q
u
al
it
y
(2
)
C
E
O
0
.3
4
5
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.3
8
1
*
*
0
.3
3
9
*
*
0
.4
4
1
*
*
0
.2
5
8
*
*
0
.2
6
5
*
*
0
.2
9
5
*
*
0
.1
8
1
*
P
ro
d
u
ct
q
u
al
it
y
(2
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
-
0
.0
2
3
1
.0
0
0
.3
3
5
*
*
0
.4
2
3
*
*
0
.3
5
2
*
*
0
.4
4
2
*
*
0
.3
0
1
*
*
0
.3
0
2
*
*
0
.2
8
3
*
*
D
et
ai
l-
o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
(3
)
C
E
O
0
.5
0
7
*
*
0
.3
8
1
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.4
0
3
*
*
0
.3
2
0
*
*
0
.4
1
0
*
*
0
.4
0
9
*
*
0
.2
9
0
*
*
0
.3
4
7
*
*
D
et
ai
l-
o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
(3
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
0
.3
3
1
*
*
0
.3
3
5
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.5
7
9
*
*
0
.4
2
6
*
*
0
.3
9
7
*
*
0
.3
2
5
*
*
0
.2
9
6
*
*
0
.4
0
5
*
*
In
te
g
ri
ty
A
ct
iv
it
y
in
ac
c.
w
it
h
p
ro
m
is
es
(4
)
C
E
O
0
.2
8
9
*
*
0
.3
3
9
*
*
0
.4
0
3
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.4
2
8
*
*
0
.5
2
3
*
*
0
.4
8
0
*
*
0
.2
8
6
*
*
0
.4
2
1
*
*
A
ct
iv
it
y
in
ac
c.
w
it
h
p
ro
m
is
es
(4
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
0
.0
7
4
0
.4
2
3
*
*
0
.5
7
9
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.5
6
0
*
*
0
.4
6
8
*
*
0
.4
6
8
*
*
0
.3
7
1
*
*
0
.4
0
0
*
*
L
aw
-a
b
id
in
g
b
eh
av
io
r
(5
)
C
E
O
0
.0
2
4
0
.4
4
1
*
*
0
.3
2
0
*
*
0
.4
2
8
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.3
8
5
*
*
0
.4
7
6
*
*
0
.3
2
3
*
*
0
.3
7
0
*
*
L
aw
-a
b
id
in
g
b
eh
av
io
r
(5
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
0
.0
1
9
0
.3
5
2
*
*
0
.4
2
6
*
*
0
.5
6
0
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.5
9
0
*
*
0
.4
9
6
*
*
0
.3
4
7
*
*
0
.4
7
7
*
*
B
en
ev
o
le
n
ce
S
o
ci
al
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
(6
)
C
E
O
0
.0
4
4
0
.2
5
8
*
*
0
.4
1
0
*
*
0
.5
2
3
*
*
0
.3
8
5
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.5
2
1
*
*
0
.1
9
0
*
0
.4
3
2
*
*
S
o
ci
al
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
(6
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
-
0
.0
6
3
0
.4
4
2
*
0
.3
9
7
*
*
0
.4
6
8
*
*
0
.5
9
0
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.5
1
5
*
*
0
.4
2
2
*
*
0
.4
3
5
*
*
E
x
te
n
si
v
e
p
u
b
li
c
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(7
)
C
E
O
0
.1
4
6
0
.2
6
5
*
*
0
.4
0
9
*
*
0
.4
8
0
*
*
0
.4
7
6
*
*
0
.5
2
1
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.3
0
8
*
*
0
.5
3
9
*
*
E
x
te
n
si
v
e
p
u
b
li
c
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(7
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
-
0
.0
6
8
0
.3
0
1
*
*
0
.3
2
5
*
*
0
.4
6
8
*
*
0
.5
1
5
*
*
0
.5
1
5
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.5
7
0
*
*
0
.4
6
5
*
*
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
q
u
al
it
y
O
b
je
ct
iv
it
y
(8
)
C
E
O
0
.2
4
9
*
*
0
.2
9
5
*
*
0
.2
9
9
*
*
0
.2
8
6
*
*
0
.3
2
3
*
*
0
.3
0
8
*
*
0
.3
0
8
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.4
6
5
*
*
O
b
je
ct
iv
it
y
(8
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
-
0
.0
1
8
0
.3
0
2
*
*
0
.2
9
6
*
*
0
.3
7
1
*
*
0
.4
2
2
*
*
0
.4
2
2
*
*
0
.5
7
0
*
*
1
.0
0
0
.4
9
4
*
*
In
te
ll
ig
ib
il
it
y
(9
)
C
E
O
0
.1
0
9
0
.1
8
1
*
0
.3
4
7
*
*
0
.4
2
1
*
*
0
.3
7
0
*
*
0
.5
3
9
*
*
0
.5
3
9
*
*
0
.4
6
5
*
*
1
.0
0
In
te
ll
ig
ib
il
it
y
(9
)
C
o
m
p
an
y
0
.1
8
6
*
0
.2
8
3
*
*
0
.4
0
5
*
*
0
.4
0
0
*
*
0
.4
3
5
*
*
0
.4
3
5
*
*
0
.4
6
5
*
*
0
.4
9
4
*
*
1
.0
0
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
w
it
h
p
£
0
.0
5
;
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
w
it
h
p
£
0
.0
1
.
15
References
Barney, J. B. and M. H. Hansen: 1994, ‘Trustworthiness
as a Source of Competitive Advantage’, Strategic
Management Journal 15(4), 175–190.
Bentele, G.: 1994, ‘O¨ffentliches Vertrauen – normative
und soziale Grundlage fu¨r Public Relations’, in
W. Armbrecht and U. Zabel (eds.), Normative Aspekte
der Public Relations (Eine Einfu¨hrung, Opladen)),
pp. 131–158.
Bentele, G. and R. Seidenglanz: 2005, ‘Vertrauen und
Glaubwu¨rdigkeit’, in G. Bentele, R. Fro¨hlich and
P. Szyszka (eds.), Handbuch der Public Relations. Wis-
senschaftliche Grundlagen und berufliches Handeln (Verlag
fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden), pp. 346–360.
Butler, J. K.: 1991, ‘Towards Understanding and Mea-
suring Conditions of Trust: Evolution of a Conditions
of Trust Inventory’, Journal of Management 17(3), 643–
663.
Butler, J. K. and R. S. Cantrell: 1984, ‘A Behavioral
Decision Theory Approach to Modeling Dyadic Trust
in Superiors and Subordinates’, Psychological Reports
55(1), 19–28.
Caldwell, C. and S. Clapham: 2003, ‘Organizational
Trustworthiness. An International Perspective’, Journal
of Business Ethics 47(4), 349–364.
Caldwell, C., B. Davis and J. A. Devine: 2008a, ‘Trust,
Faith, and Betrayal: Insights from Management for the
Wise Believer’, Journal of Business Ethics (Online).
Caldwell, C., L. A. Hayes, R. Karri and P. Bernal: 2008b,
‘Ethical Stewardship – Implications for Leadership and
Trust’, Journal of Business Ethics 78(1–2), 153–164.
Carnevale, D. G.: 1995, Trustworthy Government: Leader-
ship and Management Strategies for Building Trust and
High Performance (Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco,
CA).
Christen, C. T.: 2004, ‘Predicting Willingness to Nego-
tiate: The Effects of Perceived Power and Trustwor-
thiness in a Model of Strategic Public Relations’,
Journal of Public Relations Research 16(3), 243–267.
Cummings, L. L. and P. Bromiley: 1996, ‘The Organi-
zational Trust Inventory (OTI): Development and
Validation’, in R.M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler (eds.),
Trust in Organizations (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA),
pp. 302–330.
Currall, S. C. and A. C. Inkpen: 2002, ‘A Multilevel
Approach to Trust in Joint Ventures’, Journal of Inter-
national Business Studies 33(3), 479–495.
Dimmick, J., Y. Chen and Z. Li: 2004, ‘Competition
Between the Internet and Traditional News Media:
The Gratification-Opportunities Niche Dimension’,
Journal of Media Economics 17(1), 19–33.
Dyer, J. H. and W. Chu: 2003, ‘The Role of Trust-
worthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and
Improving Performance: Empirical Evidence from
United States, Japan, and Korea’, Organization Science
14(1), 57–68.
Grunig, L. A., J. E. Grunig and D. M. Dozier: 2002,
Excellent Public Relations and Effective Organizations. A
Study of Communication Management in Three Countries
(Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ).
Hardin, R.: 1991, ‘Trusting Persons, Trusting Institu-
tions’, in R. Zeckhauser (ed.), Strategy and Choice
(MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), pp. 185–209.
Hardin, R.: 2006, Trust (Polity Press, Cambridge).
Hon, L. C. and J. E. Grunig: 1999, Guidelines for Mea-
suring Relationships in Public Relations (Institution for
Public Relations, Gainesville, FL).
Hosmer, L. T.: 1995, ‘Trust: The Connecting Link
Between Organizational Theory and Philosophical Eth-
ics’, The Academy of Management Review 20(2), 379–403.
Huang, Y. H.: 2001, ‘OPRA: A Cross-Cultural, Multi-
ple-Item Scale for Measuring Organization–Public
Relationships’, Journal of Public Relations Research 13(1),
61–90.
Kaye, B. K. and T. J. Johnson: 2002, ‘Online and the
Know: Uses and Gratifications of the Web for Political
Information’, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media
46(1), 54–71.
Ki, E.-J. and L. C. Hon: 2007, ‘Testing the Linkages
Among the Organization–Public Relationship and
Attitude and Behavioral Intentions’, Journal of Public
Relations Research 19(1), 1–23.
Kohring, M. and J. Matthes: 2007, ‘Trust in News Media.
Development and Validation of a Multidimensional
Scale’, Communication Research 34(2), 231–252.
La¨msa¨, A.-M. and R. Pucetaite: 2006, ‘Development of
Organizational Trust Among Employees from a
Contextual Perspective’, Business Ethics: A European
Review 15(2), 130–141.
Luhmann, N.: 1979, Trust and Power (Wiley, New York).
Mayer, R., J. Davis and D. Schoormann: 1995, ‘An
Integrative Model of Organizational Trust’, Academy of
Management Review 20(3), 709–734.
McAllister, D.: 1995, ‘Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust
as Foundation for Interpersonal Cooperation in
Organizations’, The Academy of Management Journal
38(1), 24–59.
Mo¨llering, G., R. Bachmann and S. H. Lee: 2004,
‘Understanding Organizational Trust – Foundations,
Constellations, and Issues of Operationalisation’, Jour-
nal of Managerial Psychology 19(6), 556–570.
Mo¨llering, G. and J. Sydow: 2005, ‘Kollektiv, kooper-
ativ, reflexiv: Vertrauen und Glaubwu¨rdigkeit in
16
Unternehmungen und Unternehmensnetzwerken’, in
B. Dernbach and M. Meyer (eds.), Vertrauen und
Glaubwu¨rdigkeit: Interdisziplina¨re Perspektiven (Verlag fu¨r
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden), pp. 64–93.
Nawratil, U.: 1999, ‘Glaubwu¨rdigkeit als Faktor im
Prozess medialer Kommunikation’, in P. Ro¨ssler and
W. Wirth (eds.), Glaubwu¨rdigkeit im Internet. Frages-
tellungen, Modelle, empirische Befunde (Fischer, Mu¨n-
chen), pp. 15–32.
Park, D.-J. and B. K. Berger: 2004, ‘The Presentation of
CEOs in the Press, 1990–2000: Increasing Salience,
Positive Valence, and a Focus on Competency and
Personal Dimensions of Image’, Journal of Public Rela-
tions Research 16(1), 93–125.
Ru¨hl, M.: 2005, ‘Vertrauen–kommunikationswissens-
chaftlich betrachtet’, in B. Dernbach and M. Meyer (eds.),
Vertrauen und Glaubwu¨rdigkeit (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag).
Sako, M.: 1998, ‘Does Trust Improve Business Perfor-
mance?’, in C. Lane and R. Bachmann (eds.), Trust
Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and
Empirical Applications (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Shapiro, S. P.: 1990, ‘Collaring the Crime, Not the
Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White-Collar
Crime’, American Sociological Review 55(3), 246–365.
Skolnik, R.: 1994, ‘Portraits of the ‘‘Most Admired
Companies’’’, Public Relations Journal 50(5), 14–18.
Urban, D. and J. Mayerl: 2006, Regressionsanalyse: Theorie,
Technik und Anwendung, 2nd Edition (VS Verlag fu¨r
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden).
Wirth, W.: 1999, ‘Methodologische und konzeptionelle
Aspekte der Glaubwu¨rdigkeitsforschung’, in P. Ro¨ssler
and W. Wirth (eds.), Glaubwu¨rdigkeit im Internet.
Fragestellungen, Modelle, empirische Befunde (Fischer,
Mu¨nchen), pp. 47–66.
Zaheer, A., B. McEvily and V. Perrone: 1998, ‘Does
Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganiza-
tional and Interpersonal Trust on Performance’,
Organization Science 9(2), 141–159.
University of Fribourg,
Fribourg, Switzerland
E-mail: diana.ingenhoff@unifr.ch
17
